#include "hook.h"
+#include <sa/keymat_v2.h>
#include <encoding/payloads/nonce_payload.h>
#include <encoding/payloads/cert_payload.h>
#include <encoding/payloads/auth_payload.h>
auth_payload_t *auth_payload;
auth_method_t auth_method;
signature_scheme_t scheme;
- keymat_t *keymat;
+ keymat_v2_t *keymat;
auth = auth_cfg_create();
private = lib->credmgr->get_private(lib->credmgr, KEY_ANY, this->id, auth);
key_type_names, private->get_type(private));
return FALSE;
}
- keymat = ike_sa->get_keymat(ike_sa);
+ keymat = (keymat_v2_t*)ike_sa->get_keymat(ike_sa);
octets = keymat->get_auth_octets(keymat, TRUE, this->ike_init,
this->nonce, this->id, this->reserved);
if (!private->sign(private, scheme, octets, &auth_data))
#include "hook.h"
+#include <sa/keymat_v2.h>
#include <encoding/generator.h>
#include <encoding/payloads/nonce_payload.h>
#include <encoding/payloads/auth_payload.h>
auth_payload_t *auth_payload;
auth_method_t auth_method;
signature_scheme_t scheme;
- keymat_t *keymat;
+ keymat_v2_t *keymat;
identification_t *id;
char reserved[3];
generator_t *generator;
id->destroy(id);
return FALSE;
}
- keymat = ike_sa->get_keymat(ike_sa);
+ keymat = (keymat_v2_t*)ike_sa->get_keymat(ike_sa);
octets = keymat->get_auth_octets(keymat, FALSE, this->ike_init,
this->nonce, id, reserved);
if (!private->sign(private, scheme, octets, &auth_data))
#include "eap_authenticator.h"
#include <daemon.h>
+#include <sa/keymat_v2.h>
#include <sa/authenticators/eap/eap_method.h>
#include <encoding/payloads/auth_payload.h>
#include <encoding/payloads/eap_payload.h>
if (vendor)
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "server requested vendor specific EAP method %d-%d ",
- "(id 0x%02X)", type, vendor, in->get_identifier(in));
+ "(id 0x%02X)", type, vendor, in->get_identifier(in));
}
else
{
chunk_t auth_data, recv_auth_data;
identification_t *other_id;
auth_cfg_t *auth;
- keymat_t *keymat;
+ keymat_v2_t *keymat;
auth_payload = (auth_payload_t*)message->get_payload(message,
AUTHENTICATION);
return FALSE;
}
other_id = this->ike_sa->get_other_id(this->ike_sa);
- keymat = this->ike_sa->get_keymat(this->ike_sa);
+ keymat = (keymat_v2_t*)this->ike_sa->get_keymat(this->ike_sa);
auth_data = keymat->get_psk_sig(keymat, TRUE, init, nonce,
this->msk, other_id, this->reserved);
recv_auth_data = auth_payload->get_data(auth_payload);
auth_payload_t *auth_payload;
identification_t *my_id;
chunk_t auth_data;
- keymat_t *keymat;
+ keymat_v2_t *keymat;
my_id = this->ike_sa->get_my_id(this->ike_sa);
- keymat = this->ike_sa->get_keymat(this->ike_sa);
+ keymat = (keymat_v2_t*)this->ike_sa->get_keymat(this->ike_sa);
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "authentication of '%Y' (myself) with %N",
my_id, auth_class_names, AUTH_CLASS_EAP);
#include <daemon.h>
#include <encoding/payloads/auth_payload.h>
+#include <sa/keymat_v2.h>
typedef struct private_psk_authenticator_t private_psk_authenticator_t;
auth_payload_t *auth_payload;
shared_key_t *key;
chunk_t auth_data;
- keymat_t *keymat;
+ keymat_v2_t *keymat;
- keymat = this->ike_sa->get_keymat(this->ike_sa);
+ keymat = (keymat_v2_t*)this->ike_sa->get_keymat(this->ike_sa);
my_id = this->ike_sa->get_my_id(this->ike_sa);
other_id = this->ike_sa->get_other_id(this->ike_sa);
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "authentication of '%Y' (myself) with %N",
enumerator_t *enumerator;
bool authenticated = FALSE;
int keys_found = 0;
- keymat_t *keymat;
+ keymat_v2_t *keymat;
auth_payload = (auth_payload_t*)message->get_payload(message, AUTHENTICATION);
if (!auth_payload)
{
return FAILED;
}
- keymat = this->ike_sa->get_keymat(this->ike_sa);
+ keymat = (keymat_v2_t*)this->ike_sa->get_keymat(this->ike_sa);
recv_auth_data = auth_payload->get_data(auth_payload);
my_id = this->ike_sa->get_my_id(this->ike_sa);
other_id = this->ike_sa->get_other_id(this->ike_sa);
#include <daemon.h>
#include <encoding/payloads/auth_payload.h>
+#include <sa/keymat_v2.h>
typedef struct private_pubkey_authenticator_t private_pubkey_authenticator_t;
auth_payload_t *auth_payload;
auth_method_t auth_method;
signature_scheme_t scheme;
- keymat_t *keymat;
+ keymat_v2_t *keymat;
id = this->ike_sa->get_my_id(this->ike_sa);
auth = this->ike_sa->get_auth_cfg(this->ike_sa, TRUE);
key_type_names, private->get_type(private));
return status;
}
- keymat = this->ike_sa->get_keymat(this->ike_sa);
+ keymat = (keymat_v2_t*)this->ike_sa->get_keymat(this->ike_sa);
octets = keymat->get_auth_octets(keymat, FALSE, this->ike_sa_init,
this->nonce, id, this->reserved);
if (private->sign(private, scheme, octets, &auth_data))
key_type_t key_type = KEY_ECDSA;
signature_scheme_t scheme;
status_t status = NOT_FOUND;
- keymat_t *keymat;
+ keymat_v2_t *keymat;
auth_payload = (auth_payload_t*)message->get_payload(message, AUTHENTICATION);
if (!auth_payload)
}
auth_data = auth_payload->get_data(auth_payload);
id = this->ike_sa->get_other_id(this->ike_sa);
- keymat = this->ike_sa->get_keymat(this->ike_sa);
+ keymat = (keymat_v2_t*)this->ike_sa->get_keymat(this->ike_sa);
octets = keymat->get_auth_octets(keymat, TRUE, this->ike_sa_init,
this->nonce, id, this->reserved);
auth = this->ike_sa->get_auth_cfg(this->ike_sa, FALSE);
* @param group diffie hellman group
* @return DH object, NULL if group not supported
*/
- diffie_hellman_t* (*create_dh)(keymat_t *this, diffie_hellman_group_t group);
-
- /**
- * Derive keys for the IKE_SA.
- *
- * These keys are not handed out, but are used by the associated signers,
- * crypters and authentication functions.
- *
- * @param proposal selected algorithms
- * @param dh diffie hellman key allocated by create_dh()
- * @param nonce_i initiators nonce value
- * @param nonce_r responders nonce value
- * @param id IKE_SA identifier
- * @param rekey_prf PRF of old SA if rekeying, PRF_UNDEFINED otherwise
- * @param rekey_sdk SKd of old SA if rekeying
- * @return TRUE on success
- */
- bool (*derive_ike_keys)(keymat_t *this, proposal_t *proposal,
- diffie_hellman_t *dh, chunk_t nonce_i,
- chunk_t nonce_r, ike_sa_id_t *id,
- pseudo_random_function_t rekey_function,
- chunk_t rekey_skd);
- /**
- * Derive keys for a CHILD_SA.
- *
- * The keys for the CHILD_SA are allocated in the integ and encr chunks.
- * An implementation might hand out encrypted keys only, which are
- * decrypted in the kernel before use.
- * If no PFS is used for the CHILD_SA, dh can be NULL.
- *
- * @param proposal selected algorithms
- * @param dh diffie hellman key allocated by create_dh(), or NULL
- * @param nonce_i initiators nonce value
- * @param nonce_r responders nonce value
- * @param encr_i chunk to write initiators encryption key to
- * @param integ_i chunk to write initiators integrity key to
- * @param encr_r chunk to write responders encryption key to
- * @param integ_r chunk to write responders integrity key to
- * @return TRUE on success
- */
- bool (*derive_child_keys)(keymat_t *this,
- proposal_t *proposal, diffie_hellman_t *dh,
- chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r,
- chunk_t *encr_i, chunk_t *integ_i,
- chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r);
- /**
- * Get SKd to pass to derive_ikey_keys() during rekeying.
- *
- * @param skd chunk to write SKd to (internal data)
- * @return PRF function to derive keymat
- */
- pseudo_random_function_t (*get_skd)(keymat_t *this, chunk_t *skd);
+ diffie_hellman_t* (*create_dh)(keymat_t *this,
+ diffie_hellman_group_t group);
/*
* Get a AEAD transform to en-/decrypt and sign/verify IKE messages.
aead_t* (*get_aead)(keymat_t *this, bool in);
/**
- * Generate octets to use for authentication procedure (RFC4306 2.15).
- *
- * This method creates the plain octets and is usually signed by a private
- * key. PSK and EAP authentication include a secret into the data, use
- * the get_psk_sig() method instead.
- *
- * @param verify TRUE to create for verfification, FALSE to sign
- * @param ike_sa_init encoded ike_sa_init message
- * @param nonce nonce value
- * @param id identity
- * @param reserved reserved bytes of id_payload
- * @return authentication octets
- */
- chunk_t (*get_auth_octets)(keymat_t *this, bool verify, chunk_t ike_sa_init,
- chunk_t nonce, identification_t *id,
- char reserved[3]);
- /**
- * Build the shared secret signature used for PSK and EAP authentication.
- *
- * This method wraps the get_auth_octets() method and additionally
- * includes the secret into the signature. If no secret is given, SK_p is
- * used as secret (used for EAP methods without MSK).
- *
- * @param verify TRUE to create for verfification, FALSE to sign
- * @param ike_sa_init encoded ike_sa_init message
- * @param nonce nonce value
- * @param secret optional secret to include into signature
- * @param id identity
- * @param reserved reserved bytes of id_payload
- * @return signature octets
- */
- chunk_t (*get_psk_sig)(keymat_t *this, bool verify, chunk_t ike_sa_init,
- chunk_t nonce, chunk_t secret,
- identification_t *id, char reserved[3]);
- /**
* Destroy a keymat_t.
*/
void (*destroy)(keymat_t *this);
return NULL;
}
-METHOD(keymat_t, get_auth_octets, chunk_t,
- private_keymat_v1_t *this, bool verify, chunk_t ike_sa_init,
- chunk_t nonce, identification_t *id, char reserved[3])
-{
- return chunk_empty;
-}
-
-METHOD(keymat_t, get_psk_sig, chunk_t,
- private_keymat_v1_t *this, bool verify, chunk_t ike_sa_init,
- chunk_t nonce, chunk_t secret, identification_t *id, char reserved[3])
-{
- return chunk_empty;
-}
-
METHOD(keymat_t, destroy, void,
private_keymat_v1_t *this)
{
.public = {
.keymat = {
.create_dh = _create_dh,
- .derive_ike_keys = _derive_ike_keys,
- .derive_child_keys = _derive_child_keys,
- .get_skd = _get_skd,
.get_aead = _get_aead,
- .get_auth_octets = _get_auth_octets,
- .get_psk_sig = _get_psk_sig,
.destroy = _destroy,
},
},
METHOD(keymat_t, create_dh, diffie_hellman_t*,
private_keymat_v2_t *this, diffie_hellman_group_t group)
{
- return lib->crypto->create_dh(lib->crypto, group);;
+ return lib->crypto->create_dh(lib->crypto, group);
}
/**
return TRUE;
}
-METHOD(keymat_t, derive_ike_keys, bool,
+METHOD(keymat_v2_t, derive_ike_keys, bool,
private_keymat_v2_t *this, proposal_t *proposal, diffie_hellman_t *dh,
chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r, ike_sa_id_t *id,
pseudo_random_function_t rekey_function, chunk_t rekey_skd)
return TRUE;
}
-METHOD(keymat_t, derive_child_keys, bool,
+METHOD(keymat_v2_t, derive_child_keys, bool,
private_keymat_v2_t *this, proposal_t *proposal, diffie_hellman_t *dh,
chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r, chunk_t *encr_i, chunk_t *integ_i,
chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r)
return TRUE;
}
-METHOD(keymat_t, get_skd, pseudo_random_function_t,
+METHOD(keymat_v2_t, get_skd, pseudo_random_function_t,
private_keymat_v2_t *this, chunk_t *skd)
{
*skd = this->skd;
return in ? this->aead_in : this->aead_out;
}
-METHOD(keymat_t, get_auth_octets, chunk_t,
+METHOD(keymat_v2_t, get_auth_octets, chunk_t,
private_keymat_v2_t *this, bool verify, chunk_t ike_sa_init,
chunk_t nonce, identification_t *id, char reserved[3])
{
#define IKEV2_KEY_PAD "Key Pad for IKEv2"
#define IKEV2_KEY_PAD_LENGTH 17
-METHOD(keymat_t, get_psk_sig, chunk_t,
+METHOD(keymat_v2_t, get_psk_sig, chunk_t,
private_keymat_v2_t *this, bool verify, chunk_t ike_sa_init,
chunk_t nonce, chunk_t secret, identification_t *id, char reserved[3])
{
.public = {
.keymat = {
.create_dh = _create_dh,
- .derive_ike_keys = _derive_ike_keys,
- .derive_child_keys = _derive_child_keys,
- .get_skd = _get_skd,
.get_aead = _get_aead,
- .get_auth_octets = _get_auth_octets,
- .get_psk_sig = _get_psk_sig,
.destroy = _destroy,
},
+ .derive_ike_keys = _derive_ike_keys,
+ .derive_child_keys = _derive_child_keys,
+ .get_skd = _get_skd,
+ .get_auth_octets = _get_auth_octets,
+ .get_psk_sig = _get_psk_sig,
},
.initiator = initiator,
.prf_alg = PRF_UNDEFINED,
* Implements keymat_t.
*/
keymat_t keymat;
+
+ /**
+ * Derive keys for the IKE_SA.
+ *
+ * These keys are not handed out, but are used by the associated signers,
+ * crypters and authentication functions.
+ *
+ * @param proposal selected algorithms
+ * @param dh diffie hellman key allocated by create_dh()
+ * @param nonce_i initiators nonce value
+ * @param nonce_r responders nonce value
+ * @param id IKE_SA identifier
+ * @param rekey_prf PRF of old SA if rekeying, PRF_UNDEFINED otherwise
+ * @param rekey_sdk SKd of old SA if rekeying
+ * @return TRUE on success
+ */
+ bool (*derive_ike_keys)(keymat_v2_t *this, proposal_t *proposal,
+ diffie_hellman_t *dh, chunk_t nonce_i,
+ chunk_t nonce_r, ike_sa_id_t *id,
+ pseudo_random_function_t rekey_function,
+ chunk_t rekey_skd);
+
+ /**
+ * Derive keys for a CHILD_SA.
+ *
+ * The keys for the CHILD_SA are allocated in the integ and encr chunks.
+ * An implementation might hand out encrypted keys only, which are
+ * decrypted in the kernel before use.
+ * If no PFS is used for the CHILD_SA, dh can be NULL.
+ *
+ * @param proposal selected algorithms
+ * @param dh diffie hellman key allocated by create_dh(), or NULL
+ * @param nonce_i initiators nonce value
+ * @param nonce_r responders nonce value
+ * @param encr_i chunk to write initiators encryption key to
+ * @param integ_i chunk to write initiators integrity key to
+ * @param encr_r chunk to write responders encryption key to
+ * @param integ_r chunk to write responders integrity key to
+ * @return TRUE on success
+ */
+ bool (*derive_child_keys)(keymat_v2_t *this,
+ proposal_t *proposal, diffie_hellman_t *dh,
+ chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r,
+ chunk_t *encr_i, chunk_t *integ_i,
+ chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r);
+ /**
+ * Get SKd to pass to derive_ikey_keys() during rekeying.
+ *
+ * @param skd chunk to write SKd to (internal data)
+ * @return PRF function to derive keymat
+ */
+ pseudo_random_function_t (*get_skd)(keymat_v2_t *this, chunk_t *skd);
+
+ /**
+ * Generate octets to use for authentication procedure (RFC4306 2.15).
+ *
+ * This method creates the plain octets and is usually signed by a private
+ * key. PSK and EAP authentication include a secret into the data, use
+ * the get_psk_sig() method instead.
+ *
+ * @param verify TRUE to create for verfification, FALSE to sign
+ * @param ike_sa_init encoded ike_sa_init message
+ * @param nonce nonce value
+ * @param id identity
+ * @param reserved reserved bytes of id_payload
+ * @return authentication octets
+ */
+ chunk_t (*get_auth_octets)(keymat_v2_t *this, bool verify,
+ chunk_t ike_sa_init, chunk_t nonce,
+ identification_t *id, char reserved[3]);
+ /**
+ * Build the shared secret signature used for PSK and EAP authentication.
+ *
+ * This method wraps the get_auth_octets() method and additionally
+ * includes the secret into the signature. If no secret is given, SK_p is
+ * used as secret (used for EAP methods without MSK).
+ *
+ * @param verify TRUE to create for verfification, FALSE to sign
+ * @param ike_sa_init encoded ike_sa_init message
+ * @param nonce nonce value
+ * @param secret optional secret to include into signature
+ * @param id identity
+ * @param reserved reserved bytes of id_payload
+ * @return signature octets
+ */
+ chunk_t (*get_psk_sig)(keymat_v2_t *this, bool verify, chunk_t ike_sa_init,
+ chunk_t nonce, chunk_t secret,
+ identification_t *id, char reserved[3]);
};
/**
#include "child_create.h"
#include <daemon.h>
+#include <sa/keymat_v2.h>
#include <crypto/diffie_hellman.h>
#include <credentials/certificates/x509.h>
#include <encoding/payloads/sa_payload.h>
/**
* IKE_SAs keymat
*/
- keymat_t *keymat;
+ keymat_v2_t *keymat;
/**
* mode the new CHILD_SA uses (transport/tunnel/beet)
if (!this->initiator)
{
this->dh_group = ke_payload->get_dh_group_number(ke_payload);
- this->dh = this->keymat->create_dh(this->keymat, this->dh_group);
+ this->dh = this->keymat->keymat.create_dh(
+ &this->keymat->keymat, this->dh_group);
}
if (this->dh)
{
if (this->dh_group != MODP_NONE)
{
- this->dh = this->keymat->create_dh(this->keymat, this->dh_group);
+ this->dh = this->keymat->keymat.create_dh(&this->keymat->keymat,
+ this->dh_group);
}
if (this->config->use_ipcomp(this->config))
.packet_tsi = tsi ? tsi->clone(tsi) : NULL,
.packet_tsr = tsr ? tsr->clone(tsr) : NULL,
.dh_group = MODP_NONE,
- .keymat = ike_sa->get_keymat(ike_sa),
+ .keymat = (keymat_v2_t*)ike_sa->get_keymat(ike_sa),
.mode = MODE_TUNNEL,
.tfcv3 = TRUE,
.ipcomp = IPCOMP_NONE,
#include <string.h>
#include <daemon.h>
+#include <sa/keymat_v2.h>
#include <crypto/diffie_hellman.h>
#include <encoding/payloads/sa_payload.h>
#include <encoding/payloads/ke_payload.h>
/**
* Keymat derivation (from IKE_SA)
*/
- keymat_t *keymat;
+ keymat_v2_t *keymat;
/**
* nonce chosen by us
this->dh_group = ke_payload->get_dh_group_number(ke_payload);
if (!this->initiator)
{
- this->dh = this->keymat->create_dh(this->keymat,
- this->dh_group);
+ this->dh = this->keymat->keymat.create_dh(
+ &this->keymat->keymat, this->dh_group);
}
if (this->dh)
{
if (!this->dh)
{
this->dh_group = this->config->get_dh_group(this->config);
- this->dh = this->keymat->create_dh(this->keymat, this->dh_group);
+ this->dh = this->keymat->keymat.create_dh(&this->keymat->keymat,
+ this->dh_group);
if (!this->dh)
{
DBG1(DBG_IKE, "configured DH group %N not supported",
static bool derive_keys(private_ike_init_t *this,
chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r)
{
- keymat_t *old_keymat;
+ keymat_v2_t *old_keymat;
pseudo_random_function_t prf_alg = PRF_UNDEFINED;
chunk_t skd = chunk_empty;
ike_sa_id_t *id;
if (this->old_sa)
{
/* rekeying: Include old SKd, use old PRF, apply SPI */
- old_keymat = this->old_sa->get_keymat(this->old_sa);
+ old_keymat = (keymat_v2_t*)this->old_sa->get_keymat(this->old_sa);
prf_alg = old_keymat->get_skd(old_keymat, &skd);
if (this->initiator)
{
chunk_free(&this->other_nonce);
this->ike_sa = ike_sa;
- this->keymat = ike_sa->get_keymat(ike_sa);
+ this->keymat = (keymat_v2_t*)ike_sa->get_keymat(ike_sa);
this->proposal = NULL;
DESTROY_IF(this->dh);
- this->dh = this->keymat->create_dh(this->keymat, this->dh_group);
+ this->dh = this->keymat->keymat.create_dh(&this->keymat->keymat,
+ this->dh_group);
}
METHOD(task_t, destroy, void,
.ike_sa = ike_sa,
.initiator = initiator,
.dh_group = MODP_NONE,
- .keymat = ike_sa->get_keymat(ike_sa),
+ .keymat = (keymat_v2_t*)ike_sa->get_keymat(ike_sa),
.old_sa = old_sa,
);
projects / strongswan.git / commitdiff