Derive IKEv1 CHILD_SA keymat twice, once for each IPsec SA

[strongswan.git] / src / libcharon / sa / keymat_v1.h

diff --git a/src/libcharon/sa/keymat_v1.h b/src/libcharon/sa/keymat_v1.h
index e85d239..eb07e3a 100644 (file)
--- a/src/libcharon/sa/keymat_v1.h
+++ b/src/libcharon/sa/keymat_v1.h
@@ -56,6 +56,81 @@ struct keymat_v1_t {
                                                        chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r, ike_sa_id_t *id,
                                                        auth_class_t auth, shared_key_t *shared_key);
 
+       /**
+        * Derive keys for the CHILD_SA.
+        *
+        * @param proposal              selected algorithms
+        * @param dh                    diffie hellman key, NULL if none used
+        * @param spi_i                 SPI chosen by initiatior
+        * @param spi_r                 SPI chosen by responder
+        * @param nonce_i               quick mode initiator nonce
+        * @param nonce_r               quick mode responder nonce
+        * @param encr_i                allocated initiators encryption key
+        * @param integ_i               allocated initiators integrity key
+        * @param encr_r                allocated responders encryption key
+        * @param integ_r               allocated responders integrity key
+        */
+       bool (*derive_child_keys)(keymat_v1_t *this, proposal_t *proposal,
+                                               diffie_hellman_t *dh, u_int32_t spi_i, u_int32_t spi_r,
+                                               chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r,
+                                               chunk_t *encr_i, chunk_t *integ_i,
+                                               chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r);
+
+       /**
+        * Get HASH data for authentication.
+        *
+        * @param initiatior    TRUE to create HASH_I, FALSE for HASH_R
+        * @param dh                    public DH value of peer to create HASH for
+        * @param dh_other              others public DH value
+        * @param ike_sa_id             IKE_SA identifier
+        * @param sa_i                  encoded SA payload of initiator
+        * @param id                    ID of peer to create hash for
+        * @return                              allocated HASH data
+        */
+       chunk_t (*get_hash)(keymat_v1_t *this, bool initiator,
+                                               chunk_t dh, chunk_t dh_other, ike_sa_id_t *ike_sa_id,
+                                               chunk_t sa_i, identification_t *id);
+
+       /**
+        * Get HASH data for integrity/authentication in Phase 2 exchanges.
+        *
+        * @param message               message to generate the HASH data for
+        * @return                              allocated HASH data
+        */
+       chunk_t (*get_hash_phase2)(keymat_v1_t *this, message_t *message);
+
+
+       /**
+        * Returns the IV for a message with the given message ID.
+        *
+        * @param mid                   message ID
+        * @return                              IV (needs to be freed)
+        */
+       chunk_t (*get_iv)(keymat_v1_t *this, u_int32_t mid);
+
+       /**
+        * Updates the IV for the next message with the given message ID.
+        *
+        * A call of confirm_iv() is required in order to actually make the IV
+        * available.  This is needed for the inbound case where we store the last
+        * block of the encrypted message but want to update the IV only after
+        * verification of the decrypted message.
+        *
+        * @param mid                   message ID
+        * @param last_block    last block of encrypted message (gets cloned)
+        */
+       void (*update_iv)(keymat_v1_t *this, u_int32_t mid, chunk_t last_block);
+
+       /**
+        * Confirms the updated IV for the given message ID.
+        *
+        * To actually make the new IV available via get_iv this method has to
+        * be called after update_iv.
+        *
+        * @param mid                   message ID
+        */
+       void (*confirm_iv)(keymat_v1_t *this, u_int32_t mid);
+
 };
 
 /**